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Although insurance companies have been insuring all kinds of products and
catastrophic events for hundreds of years, cyber insurance, which covers a
company’s losses and costs stemming from a cyberattack, is a relatively new
concept.1 Ever the trailblazer in insurance, Lloyd’s of London (“Lloyd’s”) was
one of the first companies to sell coverage for cyber-related incidents in 1999,2
in what must have seemed then like a blatant attempt to get customers to invest
in an unnecessary overabundance of caution. Twenty years later, cyberattacks
are an everyday occurrence, and a single successful breach can cause an
organization to incur expenses totaling hundreds of thousands, even millions of
dollars.3
With the rising number of successful cyberattacks,4 and businesses
increasingly turning to their insurance policies to recover their losses,5 it is
important to understand how insurers are managing the ever-growing number of
claims. If cyber insurance policies cover all costs stemming from a breach, and
1
See Kelly Bissell et al., Ninth Annual Cost of Cybercrime Study, ACCENTURE, 18–19
(Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.accenture.com/_acnmedia/pdf-96/accenture-2019-cost-ofcybercrime-study-final.pdf (listing the different types of cyberattack-related costs, such as
information loss, cost of business disruption, and cost of equipment damage).
2
See Renee Dudley, The Extortion Economy: How Insurance Companies Are Fueling
a Rise in Ransomware Attacks, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 27, 2019),
https://www.propublica.org/article/the-extortion-economy-how-insurance-companies-arefueling-a-rise-in-ransomware-attacks (noting that Lloyd’s of London said they “pioneered
the first cyber liability policy in 1999.”).
3
See Shauhin A. Talesh, Data Breach, Privacy, And Cyber Insurance: How Insurance
Companies Act As “Compliance Managers” For Businesses, 43 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 417,
426 (2018) (explaining that cyber insurance covers “the liability that flows from the loss,”
which includes damages to third parties, litigation costs, and the insured’s costs of
correcting and managing the breach and its economic consequences).
4
Adam B. Shniderman, Prove It! Judging the Hostile-or-Warlike-Action Exclusion in
Cyber-Insurance Policies, 129 YALE L.J. F. 64, 84 (2019).
5
See Andrew Granato & Andy Polacek, The Growth and Challenges of Cyber
Insurance, FED. RES. BANK OF CHI. (2019), https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/
chicago-fed-letter/2019/426 (noting the increasing number of businesses purchasing cyber
insurance to cover cyber incident costs).
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companies report additional losses every year, can traditional insurance business
models continue to offset the threats?6 How much longer before a massive
cyberattack deals a catastrophic blow to a major insurer?7 How do we ensure
the cyber insurance policy’s survival when we have missed the writing on the
wall?8
Section II of this article will discuss the problems currently facing the cyber
insurance industry and address whether or not the current model is adequate and
sustainable in the long term. Section III will discuss the conflicting claims as
seen through the lens of the insurance companies, their customers, and industry
analysts. Section IV will set out the various past legal responses to the increase
in cyber insurance claims. Section V will discuss future trends in this area, and
an assessment in Section VI of the past legal responses will show that these will
not successfully deal with what is expected of the current cyber insurance
framework. To that end, Section VII will propose solutions to this quandary.
I. CYBER CRIMES ARE HERE TO STAY, BUT WHAT ABOUT CYBER
INSURANCE?
Once upon a time in the not so distant past, paper was king. Businesses
recorded their transactions on paper, organizations recorded information on
paper, and everything from plane tickets to photographs to medical records was
printed on paper. Generating, filing, storing, and retrieving all those paper
records was laborious, time-consuming, and space-consuming. However, the
advent of the computer has virtually eliminated everything that made recordkeeping expensive and cumbersome, and today computers dominate the day-today operations of every business.9 In fact, computer technology has quickly
permeated every other part of our day-to-day lives as well. Computers are the
6
See Peter Manchester, Why Insurance Business Models Are Going to Change, EY
(Sept. 13, 2019), https://www.ey.com/en_us/innovation-in-insurance/why-insurancebusiness-models-are-going-to-change (describing traditional insurance models, such as
investing in multiple channels and profiting off distribution networks).
7
See Denise Matthews, 2019 Report on the Cybersecurity Insurance and Identity Theft
Coverage Supplement, NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COMM’RS 1 (Sept. 12, 2019),
https://content.naic.org/sites/default/files/inline-files/Cyber_Supplement_2019_Report_
Final%20%281%29.pdf (explaining how insurers face “cybersecurity attacks in their daily
operations” and noting that cybercriminals are interested in “obtaining personal information
for financial gain”).
8
See David L. Vicevich, The Case for a Federal Cyber Insurance Program, 97 NEB. L.
REV. 555, 577 (2018) (observing that recent statistics point to the cybersecurity industry
greatly exceeding the insurance market’s capacity).
9
See Aman Goel, 10 Best Programming Languages to Learn in 2020 (for Job &
Future), HACKR.IO, https://hackr.io/blog/best-programming-languages-to-learn-2020-jobsfuture (last updated Sept. 14, 2020) (noting that computers “have entered every industry”
and are extremely beneficial for organizing and accessing personal information).
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way we communicate, conduct business, shop, and even date, sparing us the
inconvenience of dealing with paper documents and providing a way to store
data someplace where it can be readily accessed at any time of the day from
practically anywhere.10
These advancements come at a cost. The more activities we control with
technology and the internet, the greater our reliance on them.11 Coupled with
the massive amounts of data stored by the technology we use, there is increasing
potential for risk of a cyberattack, defined as a deliberate and malicious act
intended to harm an organization’s critical IT infrastructure, often through the
internet.12 The economic consequences of a cyberattack can be extensive:
businesses often must repair or replace equipment and pay for additional labor
and company downtime; upgrade cybersecurity programs and equipment; cover
consultant fees; and even pay hefty regulatory penalties for failing to protect
confidential information to comply with data breach reporting requirements or
to implement required privacy or security measures.13 In addition, major data
breaches often spur costly litigation and cross-litigation between multiple parties
due to inherent interdependencies, which adds to burgeoning costs on all sides.14
For example, health insurer Anthem suffered a data breach in 2015 that led to a

10 See Vicevich, supra note 8, at 604 (explaining that the fast-paced developments in
telecommunications and the internet that made them so successful also made them
insecure).
11 See Talesh, supra note 3, at 418 (explaining that as consumer, financial, and health
information are increasingly stored in electronic form, the potential for cybersecurity
breaches also increases); see also Bissell et al., supra note 1, at 8 (noting that “[f]ewer than
one in four companies relied on the Internet for their business operations 10 years ago; now,
it is 100 percent.”).
12 See AMOS N. GUIORA, CYBERSECURITY: GEOPOLITICS, LAW AND POLICY 17
(Routledge ed., 2017); see also Bissell et al., supra note 1, at 6–10 (defining cyberattacks as,
“malicious activity conducted against the organization through the IT infrastructure via the
internal or external networks, or the Internet”).
13 See SCOTT M. SEAMAN & JASON R. SCHULZE, ALLOCATION OF LOSSES IN COMPLEX
INS. COVERAGE CLAIMS § 17:4 (2019) (explaining that policies may cover losses from
cyberattacks as well as civil lawsuits and regulatory investigations and actions); see also
Devlin Barrett, Capital One Fined $80 Million for 2019 Hack of 100 Million Credit Card
Applications, WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nationalsecurity/capital-one-fined-2019-hack/2020/08/06/90c2c836-d7f3-11ea-aff6220dd3a14741_story.html (citing an $80 million fine that Capital One is to pay U.S.
regulators over a 2019 hacking incident where approximately 100 million credit card
applications were illegally accessed).
14 See Toni Scott Reed, Cybercrime and Technology Losses: Claims and Potential
Insurance Coverage for Modern Cyber Risks, 54 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 153, 163
(2019) (noting that certain cyberattacks often lead to class action lawsuits that require
extensive litigation and can result in excessive damages); see Vicevich, supra note 8, at 578
(discussing the total estimated damages for the WannaCry, Love Bug, Target, and Anthem
cybersecurity breaches).
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$115 million class action settlement.15 Retailer Target estimated that the nowinfamous breach of 2013 cost them almost $300 million, including nearly $89
million in settlements alone.16 Further, in 2017, pharmaceutical giant Merck’s
operations were crippled by the NotPetya malware, ultimately resulting in $1.3
billion in losses.17
Similarly, smaller companies are not spared. The impact of cyberattacks
continues to grow exponentially: the average amount a U.S. business loses due
to a data breach has grown from $3.54 million in 2006 to $8.19 million in 2019.18
Annual costs in the U.S. run in the billions, but on a global scale, businesses
stand to lose over $5.2 trillion over the next five years due to cybercrimes.19
This is indeed a worrying trend—these kinds of figures can threaten an
organization’s very survival—and today’s reports show that cyberattacks are
becoming increasingly frequent and more sophisticated over time.20 Businesses
in 2019 are nearly one-third more likely to suffer a cybersecurity breach than
they were in 2014.21 As a result, those that have fallen victim to such attacks
have started turning to their insurance companies for coverage against losses,22
as well as for guidance on how to improve their cybersecurity efforts and how
to respond when a cyberattacker demands a ransom.23 Premiums for cyber
policies in the US grew from $1.8 billion in 2017 to $2 billion in 2018, more
than double of what was reported in 2015.24 In recent years the number of
Vicevich, supra note 8, at 578.
Vincent Lynch, Cost of 2013 Target Data Breach Nears $300 Million, HASHED OUT
(May 26, 2017), https://www.thesslstore.com/blog/2013-target-data-breach-settled/
(detailing settlements: $10 million to consumers, $19 million to Mastercard, $39.4 million
to financial institutions, and $18.5 to state governments).
17 Riley Griffin et al., Was It an Act of War? That’s Merck Cyber Attack’s $1.3 Billion
Insurance Question., BLOOMBERG (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/
national/2019/12/03/550039.htm.
18 IBM, COST OF A DATA BREACH REPORT 10 (2019), https://www.ibm.com/
downloads/cas/RDEQK07R.
19 Bissell et al., supra note 1, at 14.
20 See Shniderman, supra note 4, at 84 (describing the growing sophistication and
frequency of cyberattacks); see also Talesh, supra note 3, at 418 (asserting that
cybersecurity breaches can threaten an organization’s very survival).
21 COST OF A DATA BREACH REPORT, supra note 18, at 11, 15. This annual report is
conducted by the Ponemon Institute and sponsored by IBM Security. Id. It analyzes data
breach costs reported by 507 organizations across 16 geographies and 17 industries, during a
period from July 2018 to Apr. 2019. Id.
22 See Shauhin A. Talesh, Insurance Companies as Corporate Regulators: The Good,
The Bad, and The Ugly, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 463, 475 (2017) (noting that organizations are
increasingly purchasing insurance to cover cyber threats).
23 See Dudley, supra note 2 (describing the advisory role insurance companies often
take in cyber extortion incidents).
24 Yotam Gutman, Cyber Insurance Is No Substitute For Robust Cybersecurity Systems,
SENTINELONE (Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/cyber-insurance-is-nosubstitute-for-robust-cybersecurity-systems/# (stating that AIG cyber-insurance claims
15
16
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insurers who offer cyber insurance has steadily risen.25
Adding to the precarious outlook for cyber insurers, the COVID-19 global
pandemic wreaked havoc across the world in just a matter of months.26
Businesses, government bodies, schools, and entire industries had to hastily
convert to fully online operations, which forced millions of people to work,
study, socialize, worship, and perform every other activity online using ofteninadequate technology, such as their home computers.27 The pandemic’s
damage to the cyber insurance industry is two-fold. First, the hasty restructuring
of organizations’ IT infrastructures has led to weakened cybersecurity, creating
a landscape ripe for cyberattackers.28 Researchers have found that between
January and March 2020, the number of organizations compromised by a
cyberattack in the U.S. and across Europe increased two, three, and even fourfold in some places.29
Second, the rapidly growing number of insurance claims and lawsuits against
insurance companies for pandemic-related claims—101 in U.S. federal courts as
of May 2020—threatens to significantly weaken the insurance industry’s
solvency.30 For example, the Wimbledon tennis tournament is set to receive a
nearly doubled between 2017 and 2018); State of the Cyber Insurance Market— Top
Trends, Insurers and Challenges: A.M. Best, AM BEST (June 18, 2019),
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2019/06/18/529747.htm.
25 Vicevich, supra note 8, at 587 (noting that cyber insurance is now offered by over
500 competing insurers); see also State of the Cyber Insurance Market, supra note 24.
26 See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R46270, GLOBAL ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COVID-19
(2020) (explaining that since the first diagnosis in late 2019, the virus has spread to over 200
countries, sickening more than 16.4 million people—a quarter of them in the U.S.—with
nearly 650,000 fatalities). More than 80 countries have closed their borders to travelers
from countries with infections, ordered businesses to close, instructed their populations to
self-quarantine, and shut down schools to an estimated 1.5 billion children. Id.
27 Hacking Against Firms Surges as Workers Take Computers Home, REUTERS (Apr.
17, 2020), https://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20200417/NEWS06/
912334100?template=printart.
28 Id.
29 Arctic Security and Team Cymru Reveal Number of Compromised Organizations Has
More Than Doubled Since Stay-at-Home Order, ARCTIC SECURITY (Apr. 21, 2020),
https://arcticsecurity.com/news/2020/04/20/arctic-security-and-team-cymru-reveal-numberof-compromised-organizations-has-more-than-doubled-since-stay-at-home-order/ (reporting
that the number of affected organizations “doubled, tripled or even quadrupled” in the first
quarter of 2020); see Hacking Against Firms Surges as Workers Take Computers Home,
supra note 27.
30 See Emma Cueto, COVID-19 Accelerating Growth of Class Action Cases, LAW360
(July 8, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1289937/covid-19-accelerating-growth-ofclass-action-cases (noting that around twenty-five percent of the 560 current pandemicrelated class action lawsuits are against insurance companies); see also Jim Sams, Number
of Federal COVID-19 Business Interruption Lawsuits at 101 and Rising, CLAIMS J. (May
21, 2020), https://www.claimsjournal.com/news/national/2020/05/21/297180.htm#
(explaining that experts believe “forcing insurers to pay such claims would undermine the
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$142 million payout from its insurer for the cancellation of the 2020 tournament
due to the COVID-19 pandemic.31 In France, a court ordered insurer AXA to
pay two months’ worth of pandemic-related revenue losses to a restaurant, seen
by many as the tip of the iceberg for business-loss claims.32 In the US, some
courts have sided with plaintiffs in their claims against insurers for COVIDrelated losses.33 Legal and accounting professionals are now encouraging
businesses to file claims for losses stemming from the pandemic, regardless of
policy language or laws seemingly favoring insurers.34 In May 2020, U.S.
business losses were estimated to be between $393 and $668 billion per month;
even paying out a fraction of those amounts could severely undermine an
insurer’s ability to respond to major cyber insurance claims.35
With the average cyber claim payout reaching six figures, total costs of
recovery totaling at seven or even eight figures, and the surge of cyberattacks,
insurers have begun to rein in payouts through a variety of methods, such as
selling policies that cover only specific cyber events, employing exclusionary
language, and focusing on human error and intervening events to disqualify
coverage.36 Unlike other types of insurance policies, such as those for property
and liability, cyber risk policies are not standardized in format or language; they
can vary greatly depending on the insurer and the insured.37 There are some

solvency of the industry”).
31 Wimbledon Shows How Pandemic Insurance Could Become Vital for Sports, Other
Events, GLOBALDATA (Apr. 13, 2020), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/
international/2020/04/13/564598.htm.
32 Bruce Brumberg, Covid-19 Business Losses Covered By Insurance: Lawyers And
CPAs Advise You To File Claim Now, FORBES (May 26, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/brucebrumberg/2020/05/26/covid-19-business-losses-covered-by-insurance-lawyersand-cpas-advise-you-to-file-claim-now/#21d7e8935eb8.
33 Kenneth M. Gorenberg and Scott N. Godes, Update on Business Interruption
Insurance Claims for COVID-19 Losses, NAT’L L. REV. (Oct. 29, 2020),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/update-business-interruption-insurance-claims-covid19-losses (citing favorable rulings for plaintiffs in COVID coverage disputes in North
Carolina, Florida, Philadelphia, and Dallas).
34 Brumberg, supra note 32; see Bethan Moorcraft, A Plaintiff Attorney’s View on
COVID-19 Business Interruption Claims, INS. BUS. AM. (June 5, 2020),
https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/us/news/breaking-news/a-plaintiff-attorneys-viewon-covid19-business-interruption-claims-224422.aspx.
35 Sams, supra note 30 (explaining that experts believe “forcing insurers to pay such
claims would undermine the solvency of the industry”).
36 See Reed, supra note 14, at 168 (explaining that standard insurance policies do not
specifically cover cyber events, and coverage might have to be determined by court
interpretation of policy language); see also Griffin et al., supra note 17 (discussing AIG’s
refusal to cover client Merck’s claim due to the “war exclusion” in their policy); Gutman,
supra note 24 (noting that insurers can cite human error to refuse payouts).
37 See SEAMAN & SCHULZE, supra note 13 (explaining that cyber policies vary from
insurer to insurer and policy to policy); see also Reed, supra note 14, at 176 (observing that
cyber policies generally do not have standard form, terms, or provisions).
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common exclusions, such as exclusions for willful, intentional, and criminal acts
by employees; exclusions for patent and trade secrets; and exclusions for breach
of contract.38 For example, the Merck breach highlights an exclusion found in
many cyber insurance policies: the hostile-or-warlike exclusion, which exempts
the insurer from covering losses when the nature of the cyberattack was “warlike” and initiated by a state actor.39 In the aftermath of the NotPetya attacks,
the White House announced that the perpetrator had been the Russian military,
the intended target Ukraine, and that victims like Merck were collateral
damage.40 When Merck presented claims to its thirty insurers, they were denied
coverage under the act of war exclusion, which set off a series of lawsuits still
pending in the courts.41
Another provision found in some cyber policies excludes losses not directly
resulting from computer use.42 This provision leaves companies high and dry
when their employees are victims of “spoofing,” where attackers use legitimatelooking email addresses and websites to gain entry into the organization’s
system or to trick an employee into performing a money transfer,43 and
“phishing,” where the attackers send phony email messages with clickable links
that give them access to the system.44 When employees at Apache Corporation,
an oil production company, were tricked into wiring millions to Latvian hackers,
their insurance company GAIC denied coverage due to the transfer of funds not
being a direct result of computer use, but instead the result of a multi-step fraud
process.45 The Fifth Circuit agreed.46 In an example of smaller organizations
finding themselves in similar situations, a Virginia court ruled that a real estate
company’s wiring of $42,000 to a fraudster violated a “voluntary parting”
exclusion in their cyber policy and therefore was not entitled to coverage by their
insurer.47 As grim as the outlook is on the future of cyber threats, insurers will
likely continue to seek ways to limit their exposure.48
See SEAMAN & SCHULZE, supra note 13.
Shniderman, supra note 4, at 65.
40 Granato & Polacek, supra note 5 (noting the increasing number of businesses
purchasing cyber insurance to cover cyber incident costs).
41 Griffin et al., supra note 17.
42 See SEAMAN & SCHULZE, supra note 13.
43 Reed, supra note 14, at 198.
44 Id. at 156–57.
45 Apache Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 662 F. App’x 252, 258–59 (5th Cir. 2016).
46 Id. at 252.
47 Jeff Sistrunk, Real Estate Firm Can’t Get Coverage for Email Scam, LAW360 (Feb.
21, 2020), https://www.law360.com/cybersecurity-privacy/articles/1246219/real-estatefirm-can-t-get-coverage-for-email-scam?nl_pk=9a283bed-c005-42eb-aa84
e064c4b54145&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=cybersecurit
y-privacy.
48 See infra pp. 10–11 and notes 58–59.
38
39
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But will it be enough? Hackers and hacker groups seem to be growing in
numbers, even organizing to support each other and offer their services to the
general public.49 This trend is likely to continue: experts note that cybercrimes
generally have high profit margins, while the risk of detection or prosecution is
very low.50 Virtually every major industry is affected by cybersecurity breaches,
from the business sector to government agencies; no private or public entity is
safe.51 In fact, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) has
reported that cybercrime is “progressing at an incredibly fast pace, with new
trends constantly emerging.”52 Among these trends is the availability of
ransomware53 packages for easy purchase online, where any buyer may
subscribe to an online service that creates the malware and even offers service
support to help coordinate the attacks and ransom payments.54
Moving forward, insurers whose positions have been weakened by the
proliferation of cyberattacks, and subsequent insurance claims, will be
vulnerable given the inevitability of the next large-scale attack. Analysts predict
it could cost businesses as much as $193 billion in immediate and long-term
costs.55 Today, a cataclysmic accumulation of claims by multiple insured
customers, like what occurred with the WannaCry and NotPetya malwares in
2017 and 2018 respectively, could be a coup de grâce for some insurers.56 So,
what could ensure an adequate and sustainable cyber insurance industry to
respond to the surging incidence of cyberattacks?57

49 See Drake Bennett, The Time I Sabotaged My Editor with Ransomware from the Dark
Web., BLOOMBERG (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2020-dark-webransomware/ (describing the dark web chatrooms that function as both forums for hackers
and bazaars for malware sellers and buyers).
50 Reed, supra note 14, at 160.
51 Talesh, supra note 3, at 418 (noting that the industries that have been attacked include
the financial, health care, retail, entertainment, and insurance industries).
52 Cybercrime, INTERPOL, https://www.interpol.int/Crimes/Cybercrime (last visited
Feb. 23, 2021).
53 Bennett, supra note 49 (defining ransomware as “[m]alicious software that encrypts
data on a computer or server . . . allow[ing] an attacker to extort a payment in exchange for
the decryption key”).
54 Id. (describing the dark-web chatrooms that function as both forums for hackers and
bazaars for malware sellers and buyers).
55 Najiyya Budaly, Lloyd’s To Phase In ‘Silent’ Cyber-Cover Guard By July 2021,
LAW360 (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1239018/lloyd-s-to-phase-insilent-cyber-cover-guard-by-july-2021.
56 Vicevich, supra note 8, at 578, 603 (asserting that the current cyber insurance market
is not self-sustaining and will require a federal reinsurer for major cyber events); but see
Ran Levi, What’s the Problem with Cyber Insurance?, MALICIOUS LIFE,
https://malicious.life/episode/episode-64/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2021) (contending that cyber
insurance is sustainable because insurers are able to spread the risk, as well as adequately
assess their insureds’ cyber defenses).
57 See infra Section VII.
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II. CONFLICTING CLAIMS
A. Insurance Companies: The Cyber Insurance Boom
Insurance is a risk-distribution mechanism by which the insurer pools the
risks of multiple insureds and uses their premiums to pay out claims.58 Lloyd’s,
for example, currently offers its cyber coverage through ninety-three syndicates
that provide the necessary capital responsible for accepting and spreading the
risk.59 Insurers can add an additional layer of protection with reinsurance,
offered by companies who will also assume some of the insurer’s financial
risk.60 The risk-spreading, coupled with the increasing demand for cyber
polices, have made cyber insurance profitable;61 in the U.S., for every dollar in
premiums collected, roughly thirty-five cents is paid out in claims, considerably
better than the average sixty-two cents paid out on property and casualty
claims.62 However, because the costs of cyber claims are rising and can quickly
become excessive,63 insurers are employing mitigating tactics, such as payout
limits, coverage limits, high premiums and deductibles, and tighter policy
language.64 In addition, some insurers have begun denying claims due to
“employee negligence,” which is involved in around 59 percent of all
cybersecurity breaches.65
Insurance companies have also pointed to the need for businesses to properly
assess and reduce their risk of a successful cyberattack.66 Studies have shown
there is an inverse correlation between the level of cybersecurity deployed by a
company and the cost of a data breach.67 For example, a recent study showed
that the average cost of a data breach was 95 percent higher for companies
relying solely on human intervention for cybersecurity, than for companies using
Vicevich, supra note 8, at 581.
The Lloyd’s Market, LLOYD’S, https://www.lloyds.com/about-lloyds/what-islloyds/the-lloyds-market (last visited Feb. 23, 2021).
60 Bethan Moorcraft, Facultative and Treaty Reinsurance: What’s the Difference?, INS.
BUS. AM. (June 3, 2019), https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/us/guides/facultative-andtreaty-reinsurance-whats-the-difference-168929.aspx.
61 See Gutman, supra note 24 (noting that the loss ratio for cyber policies had dropped
to as low as 32 percent in 2017, making them very profitable for insurers).
62 Dudley, supra note 2.
63 Talesh, supra note 22, at 474–75.
64 Vicevich, supra note 8, at 581, 587–88 (noting the high cost of cyber policies, which
will likely continue to rise due to increased regulation and class action lawsuits); see The
Lloyd’s Market, supra note 59 (noting the high cost of cyber policies, which will likely
continue to rise due to increased regulation and class action lawsuits).
65 Vicevich, supra note 8, at 589.
66 See infra Section VII.B.i.
67 See COST OF A DATA BREACH REPORT, supra note 18, at 59.
58
59
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automated security methods and technologies.68 Because a robust cybersecurity
program is critical to limit a company and its insurer’s exposure, some insurers
require their larger clients employ modern, comprehensive cybersecurity plans.
Failure to comply with these recommendations is grounds for refusal to pay out
claims.69 Unfortunately, many organizations lack the foresight to adequately
prepare against a cyberattack, either believing one to be unlikely, or
underestimating the potential cost.70 With insurers now offering variations of
cyber policies that cover many types of events and pay out claims for all kinds
of expenses,71 a client’s ineffective risk management is detrimental to both
insured and insurer.72 Insurance companies, however, believe this is a storm
they can weather with their current framework.73
B. Analysts: We Are Sitting on a Powder Keg
Some experts have questioned whether cyber risk is even insurable and
whether insurers can continue to underwrite these policies due to the unique
nature of cyber threats.74 First, the threats change as quickly as technology
advances and cyberattacks evolve.75 This denies insurance companies the kinds
of historical patterns and relatively consistent risk profiles they rely on to
properly assess risks.76 Second, cyber incidents can be caused by several events,
such as cybercrime, human error, war, terrorism, and natural disasters.77 Due to
the interconnected nature of businesses and technology, one cyberattack could
affect multiple companies simultaneously and lead to large interrelated losses
the insurer must cover.78 Third, cyberattacks tend to unleash a cache of financial
consequences that other types of policies would not normally cover.79 For
Id. at 58.
Gutman, supra note 24.
70 GUIORA, supra note 12, at 24.
71 Reed, supra note 14, at 170.
72 See Dudley, supra note 2 (noting that insurers assess a policyholder’s cybersecurity,
in acknowledgement that its strength against attacks is a mitigation tool both insureds and
insurers benefit from).
73 See LLOYD’S, 20 SUPERBRANDS U.K. ANN. 74, 75 (2019) (contending that Lloyd’s
will continue its successful offering of cyber insurance due to its “unrivalled concentration
of specialist underwriting expertise,” its risk-sharing model, and its ability to “anticipat[e]
and respond[] to new and emerging risks . . . using state-of-the-art modelling to create
specialist products and solutions.”).
74 See Vicevich, supra note 8, at 591 (questioning whether cyber risk is even insurable).
75 Id. at 563.
76 See Granato & Polacek, supra note 5 (“[T]here is only a limited loss history for
insurers to use when setting prices for cyber insurance premiums and coverage loss limits,
and this introduces risk.”).
77 Vicevich, supra note 8, at 563.
78 Granato & Polacek, supra note 5.
79 See Talesh, supra note 3, at 418–19 (noting that in addition to financial damages, a
68
69
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example, due to the proliferation of cyberattacks and data breaches, states have
begun passing data protection regulations that impose costly penalties on
companies that have suffered a data breach, with at least two states allowing for
class action lawsuits.80 With data flowing across state lines and businesses
operating across the nation, the potential for losses in legal costs alone is
staggering.81 Factor in stringent European Union data privacy laws that
prescribe potentially astounding penalties for breaches,82 and the damages an
insurer would need to cover could be catastrophic,83 prompting many to believe
cyber coverage is simply not sustainable.84
Another challenge experts note about the rising use of cyber insurance is that
it inadvertently contributes to the increasing number of cyberattacks, which in
turn prompts companies to seek out new or more expensive cyber policies.85 A
clear example of this is ransomware, which is malicious software that an attacker
uses to lock a victim out of their files.86 The attacker then demands payment,

data breach can result in costly fines for a company, as well as lawsuits filed by private
individuals if the company fails to comply with state notification requirements).
80 See Carla Llaneza, An Analysis on Biometric Privacy Data Regulation: A Pivot
Towards Legislation Which Supports the Individual Consumer’s Privacy Rights in Spite of
Corporate Protections, 32 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 177, 181–82, 190 (2020) (noting that
Illinois’ Biometric Information Privacy Act and the California Consumer Privacy Act both
create a private right of action for data breaches); see also Talesh, supra note 3, at 418
(discussing a recent expansion in data privacy laws, regulations, and industry guidelines).
81 See Vicevich, supra note 8, at 87 (explaining that increased regulation and successful
class action lawsuits will drive up the costs of cyber events); see also Talesh, supra note 3,
at 418 (stating that the enactment of data protection laws coupled with the flow of data
across state lines make compliance with all regulations very difficult for companies
operating on a national level).
82 See Mohammed Murad, How Biometrics Complement GDPR Regulations, IRIS ID
(June 3, 2019), https://www.irisid.com/home-biometrics-complement-gdpr-regulations/
(discussing the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation, under which noncompliance can result in penalties of up to €20 million or 4 percent of a company’s annual
worldwide revenue, whichever is greater).
83 See Josephine Wolff, Time for Regulators to Take Cyber Insurance Seriously,
LAWFARE (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/time-regulators-take-cyberinsurance-seriously (describing the fear that “a large-scale cyberattack could affect so many
customers simultaneously that insurers would be unable to pay out all the necessary
claims”); cf. Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Strengthening Cybersecurity With
Cyberinsurance Markets And Better Risk Assessment, 102 MINN. L. REV. 191, 238 (2017)
(“While there is a potential for catastrophic cyberattacks, most cyberattacks will not rise to
that level, yet the risk is still significant because the probability for a less-severe event is
very high.”).
84 See Wolff, supra note 83 (listing all of the challenges facing the cyber insurance
market and proposing several solutions needed to stabilize it).
85 See Dudley, supra note 2 (arguing that cyber insurance is both fueling and benefitting
from cyberattacks).
86 Bennett, supra note 49.
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usually in cybercurrency, and threatens to disclose the organization’s sensitive
information or prevent access to the organization’s files and website.87 These
attacks are perpetrated by individuals or groups who have usually studied their
victims and know about the critical nature of their data, their financial situations,
and whether they have cyber insurance.88 Public organizations, such as hospitals
and city government offices, are often targeted because they tend to have fewer
defense systems and a higher incentive to quickly recover the data that has been
highjacked by cyberattackers.89 When the attackers demand a ransom, its
payment is often covered by the victim’s cyber policy.90
Many people would be shocked to learn that insurers are increasingly
approving, and even recommending, the payment of ransom; insurers claim that
limiting breach costs by quickly restoring operations makes financial sense for
all involved.91 Analysts argue that the six and seven-figure ransom payments
insurers are covering have led to a steady rise in ransomware attacks and higher
extortion amounts, which in turn leads to increased demand for cyber insurance
by frightened customers.92 Without even considering the ethical concerns of
what essentially amounts to rewarding cybercrime,93 analysts believe that this
model cannot be sustained.94 Yesterday’s hackers and their malware are

Reed, supra note 14, at 158.
See Dudley, supra note 2 (noting the high likelihood that hackers specifically extort
companies that have cyber insurance); see also Targeted Ransomware Attacks: The Easy
Choice For Cybercriminals, PANDA (July 5, 2019),
https://www.pandasecurity.com/mediacenter/security/targeted-ransomware/ (explaining that
victim companies are chosen for targeted ransomware attacks according to their
vulnerabilities).
89 Dorothy Atkins, Patients Sue NJ Hospital Chain Over 2019 Ransomware Attack,
LAW360 (Feb. 14, 2020), https://www.law360.com/cybersecurityprivacy/articles/1244179/patients-sue-nj-hospital-chain-over-2019-ransomwareattack?nl_pk=9a283bed-c005-42eb-aa84e064c4b54145&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=cybersecurit
y-privacy.
90 Dudley, supra note 2.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 See id. (“The FBI and security researchers say paying ransoms contributes to the
profitability and spread of cybercrime and in some cases may ultimately be funding terrorist
regimes.”); see also Wolff, supra note 83 (stating that with respect to cyber insurance
covering ransomware payments, regulators should address “the perverse effects of coverage
that provides direct financial assistance to criminals and normalizes the payment of online
extortion demands”).
94 See DAC Beachcroft, Insurance Wordings Predictions 2020, LEXOLOGY (Feb. 4,
2020), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=52362ade-b38a-40d5-a53eeda51642eedf (questioning whether continued payment of cyber extortion without
government intervention is sustainable and arguing that the situation will become more
serious over time).
87
88
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replaced with the next wave of hackers with new malware95 seeking more
victims, demanding higher compensation, and attacking bigger fish: large, often
public enterprises with a multi-state or global presence.96 This ransom spree has
led to an average ransomware payout of $41,198 at the end of 2019 (six times
higher than in 2018), with some payouts well over the million-dollar mark.97
There are also claims that although the cyber insurance market is growing,
the frequency, impact, and cost of successful cyberattacks will outpace and
eventually overwhelm the current framework.98 Insurers are legally required to
have enough liquidity to be able to pay out all potential future claims on every
policy they have written.99 To satisfy regulators that it is financially capable of
paying its policyholders’ claims, an insurer can obtain reinsurance to assume
part of the risk.100 Some researchers, however, claim that insurers fear the
likelihood of a “Cybergeddon” event, a breach of such massive scale that it
would cause a “critical information infrastructure breakdown,” resulting in
hundreds of billions of dollars in damages in just days.101 Were such an event
to come on the heels of another catastrophic event, such as a global pandemic or
a massive earthquake, the resulting multitude of claims could potentially
devastate the entire insurance industry.102 It is true that the insurance industry

95 See Bennett, supra note 49 (describing ransomware GandCrab, used by hackers to
extract $2 billion during a period of fifteen months, which was “retired” and replaced by
subsequent ransomware).
96 See Targeted Ransomware Attacks: The Easy Choice for Cybercriminals, supra note
88 (describing the 2018 ransomware attack on Norsk Hydro, which crippled 22,000
computers across forty countries).
97 Average Ransomware Payment Increased 13% to $41,198 in Q3, 2019, HIPAA J.
(Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.hipaajournal.com/average-ransomware-payment-rises-to41198/.
98 See Pramod Borasi, Cyber Insurance Market Expected to Reach $28.6 Billion by
2026, ALLIED MARKET RES., https://www.alliedmarketresearch.com/cyber-insurance-market
(last visited Feb. 24, 2021) (citing a March 2020 report prepared by Allied Market Research,
a market research and advisory company, which projects substantial growth in the cyber
insurance market, potentially reaching $28.6 billion by 2026); see also Granato & Polacek,
supra note 5 (contending that although cyber insurance is a growing market, cyberattacks
are becoming more frequent and damaging, and significant challenges will need to be
addressed).
99 Moorcraft, supra note 60.
100 Id.
101 Kesan & Hayes, supra note 83, at 237 (discussing policy makers’ concerns about the
potential for a “cyber Pearl Harbor”); Vicevich, supra note 8, at 578 (explaining insurers’
fear of a “Cybergeddon” event that would result in catastrophic damages, representing an
existential risk to affected businesses).
102 See Granato & Polacek, supra note 5 (expanding on the idea that cyberattacks like
NotPetya, which resulted in $10 billion in damages, can potentially affect thousands of
companies simultaneously worldwide, cause large, interrelated losses that insurers will need
to cover).
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has learned much about risk spreading since the days when catastrophic events,
such as Hurricane Andrew in 1992, would wipe out insurers almost overnight.103
But insurance experts point out that if cyber risk is not brought under control,
there may be fewer and fewer underwriters who will assume the risk to enable
the existence of a cyber insurance market.104
III. PAST LEGAL RESPONSES
A. The First International Regime: The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime
In 2001, the Convention on Cybercrime of the Council of Europe convened
in Budapest, which resulted in the first international treaty on cybercrimes,
known as the Budapest Convention.105 Its principal goals were to pursue
common policy through legislation and international cooperation in order to
protect society against crimes committed through the internet and other
computer networks.106 The Budapest Convention calls on states to criminalize
a list of actions involving computer system access or private data interception;
provides procedural tools and safeguards to be used in the investigation of a
cybercrime; and creates international cooperation on cybercrime and electronic
evidence.107 This treaty remains the most important step toward a transnational
criminal law for cybercrimes, providing a useful framework that defines cyber
offenses, their prevention, and their prosecution.108 Supporters argue this has
resulted in stronger and more uniform legislation, trusted partnerships between
signatories, and better investigation and prosecution of cyber offenses, all of

103 Amy O’Conner, 25 Years Later: How Florida’s Insurance Industry Has Changed
Since Hurricane Andrew, INS. J. (Aug. 24, 2017),
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2017/08/24/462204.htm (describing the
effects of Hurricane Andrew, which had bankrupted sixteen insurance companies by the end
of 1993).
104 Silent Cyber: Danger for the Cyber Insurance Market, SAFETY4SEA (May 9,
2019), https://safety4sea.com/silent-cyber-danger-for-the-cyber-insurance-market/.
105 Details of Treaty No. 185, COUNCIL OF EUROPE,
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/185 (last visited Feb.
24, 2021).
106 Id.
107 Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, T.I.A.S. 13,174, E.T.S. No. 185 (entered
into force July 1, 2004), https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list//conventions/rms/0900001680081561; see also Brian Corcoran, A Comparative Study of
Domestic Laws Constraining Private Sector Active Defense Measures in Cyberspace, 11
HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 1, 17 (2020) (describing the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime in
general).
108 Alexandra Perloff-Giles, Transnational Cyber Offenses: Overcoming Jurisdictional
Challenges, 43 YALE J. INT’L L. 191, 217 (2018).
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which contribute to human rights and the rule of law in cyberspace.109 To date,
sixty-two countries, including the U.S., have ratified the treaty.110
For insurers that cover cyber incidents, the Budapest Convention is still the
most relevant and internationally acknowledged set of guidelines on what
constitutes a cybercrime.111 In addition, the Convention is dynamic in nature,
with follow-up mechanisms that provide valuable feedback that contributes to
the evolution of the convention.112 Insurers looking to gauge the prevalence and
scope of emerging cyber activities, and assess the risk on a regional or global
scale, can turn to the Budapest Convention for some guidance in these areas.113
B. The Response at Home
1.

The Federal Level

In 1984, the U.S. federal government enacted the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act (“CFAA”), which penalizes anyone who intentionally accesses a computer
without authorization and obtains data or knowingly transmits data that results
in intentional harm to a protected computer. 114 This legislation sought to strike
a balance between the federal government’s interest in prosecuting criminal
activity involving computers and the interests of the states to criminalize and
punish those offenses.115 Cybercrimes were in their infancy at that time, but as
they grew more sophisticated, Congress responded with amendments expanding
jurisdiction by closing loopholes, broadening the scope of the law, and
criminalizing new activities.116
Recognizing the rising cyber-threat level and potential for damage, Congress
passed the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, which focused on two principal issues:
(1) the importance of information sharing between the government and the
private sector in order to prevent and combat cyber threats and (2) the acceptable
109 Alexander Seger, The Budapest Convention in Operation: What Impact?, COE (Aug.
5, 2014), https://rm.coe.int/16803028a7.
110 Corcoran, supra note 107, at 17–18.
111 Council of Europe Reiterates Importance of Budapest Convention in Fight Against
Cybercrime, EMERGING EUROPE (Nov. 22, 2019), https://emergingeurope.com/news/council-of-europe-reiterates-importance-of-budapest-convention-in-fightagainst-cybercrime/.
112 Seger, supra note 109.
113 Id. (noting that the Budapest Convention signatories share their experiences within
their respective regions and engage in international peer reviews).
114 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1)–(5) (2018).
115 OFFICE OF LEGAL EDUC. EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. ATTORNEYS, UNITED STATES DEP’T.
OF JUST., PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES, 1 (2010).
116 Id. at 2–3.
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monitoring for the purpose of protection from cyberthreats.117 In 2018, the
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Act shifted the nation’s
cybersecurity policy strategy from defensive to offensive; the U.S. would now
use preemptive cyber operations to deter adversaries.118 No doubt the U.S.
government’s increasing focus on cybersecurity is one of the key factors insurers
consider when drafting their cyber policies.
2.

The State Level

Insurers also look to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(“NAIC”), a state-created regulatory board that sets standards, establishes best
practices, and conducts oversight of the insurance industry.119 The goal of the
NAIC is to promote uniformity in insurance laws and state regulations by
developing model laws and regulations, as well as regulatory best practices for
states to base their insurance laws on.120 Additionally, the NAIC Accreditation
Program certifies states that have demonstrated they meet legal, financial, and
organizational standards that promote insurance company financial solvency.121
States are recognizing the need for robust cybersecurity laws, and in 2019
alone, thirty-one states adopted new or amended cybersecurity-related
legislation addressing cyber-threat levels for the public and private sectors, as
well as regulations for the insurance industry.122 Washington, for example,
responded to a 26 percent rise in cyber breaches between 2017 and 2018 with a
law expanding the kinds of data breaches that must be reported to affected
consumers.123 In 2017, the New York Department of Financial Services
(“NYDFS”) enacted landmark cybersecurity legislation that regulates insurance
companies along with financial enterprises, requiring among other things
cybersecurity plans, annual risk assessments, and breach notifications.124 This
117 1 CARRIE E. COPE ET AL., CYBER RISKS, SOCIAL MEDIA AND INSURANCE § 8.02 (2019)
(Matthew Bender & Co. Inc. 2020).
118 Id.
119 See generally, Ava Lynch, What is the NAIC?, ZEBRA, https://www.thezebra.com/
what-is-the-naic/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2021) (providing an overview of the NAIC).
120 NAIC Model Laws, NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COMM’RS, https://content.naic.org/cipr_topics/
topic_naic_model_laws.htm (last updated June 30, 2020).
121 See Accreditation, NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COMM’RS, https://content.naic.org/cipr_topics/
topic_accreditation.htm (last updated June 23, 2020).
122 See Cybersecurity Legislation 2019, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 10,
2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/
cybersecurity-legislation-2019.aspx.
123 Cassie Yatcilla, Cybersecurity: How States are Protecting Their People, PRIMEPAY
(Aug. 26, 2019), https://primepay.com/blog/cybersecurity-how-states-are-protecting-theirpeople.
124 Fred Karlinsky et al., Cybersecurity Insurance Regulation: Pitfalls and Best
Practices, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Aug. 2, 2019), https://www.law.com/

128

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY
JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY

[Vol. 29.1

was followed in 2019 by a bill deeming the failure to provide adequate data
security a violation of the general business law, subject to civil suit by the State
Attorney General.125 Other states like Alabama, Mississippi, and New
Hampshire now have laws requiring cyber events be reported to state insurance
commissioners.126 These tighter controls and higher penalties translate into a
higher probability of cyber insurance claims, plus more extensive damages that
cyber policies could be required to cover.127
IV. FUTURE TRENDS
A. It Is Only Going to Get Worse
Cyberattacks will become more severe, more complex, and more difficult to
prevent.128 One recent report noted that 78 percent of organizations surveyed
had suffered network breaches in the previous year,129 and the incidence of
ransomware attacks and ransomware payments was on the rise.130 In addition,
analysts predict that collateral damage from large-scale attacks will become
more and more common.131 Furthermore, with cyberattacks remaining a
thelegalintelligencer/2019/08/02/cybersecurity-insurance-regulation-pitfalls-and-bestpractices/?slreturn=20200117134110.
125 See Cybersecurity Legislation 2019, supra note 122.
126 See id. (referring to Alabama Senate Bill 54 Chap. 98, Mississippi Senate Bill 2831,
and New Hampshire Senate Bill 194 Chap. 309).
127 See Carter Schoenberg, Cyber Insurance in the 2018 Regulatory Landscape, CSO
(Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.csoonline.com/article/3247834/cyber-insurance-in-the-2018regulatory-landscape.html (explaining that fines and penalties against organizations
violating data privacy laws could lead to insurance claims as high as eight figures).
128 See Shniderman, supra note 4.
129 CYBEREDGE, 2019 CYBERTHREAT DEFENSE REP. 6–7 (2019). The annual Cyberthreat
Defense Report is published by CyberEdge Group, a research, marketing, and publishing
firm, and sponsored by multiple cybersecurity and IT services firms. The report, which
businesses use to shape their cybersecurity policies, surveys over 1,200 IT security
practitioners from companies with 500+ employees, across seventeen countries and
representing nineteen industries. Id.
130 See id. at 3, 14 (noting that in 2019, the number of ransomware victims had risen
slightly, but the number of victims who paid the ransoms rose substantially, from 38.7
percent to 45 percent, and the number of victims that refused to pay the ransoms,
subsequently losing their data, had increased from 13.1 percent to 19.2 percent).
131 See Vicevich, supra note 8, at 592 (stating that the current insurance market has
created a “perfect storm” that is likely to generate multiple claims against insurance
companies.); see also Adam Satariano & Nicole Perlroth, Big Companies Thought
Insurance Covered a Cyberattack. They May Be Wrong., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/15/technology/cyberinsurance-notpetya-attack.html
(explaining that malware leaves an expensive trail of collateral damage that can no longer be
contained due to the interconnectivity of things today).
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primary threat, organizations will need to continually assess and address their
cyber risks and increase spending on cybersecurity measures, such as
professional risk consultants and cyber insurance policies.132 Intellectual
property assets will continue to become increasingly critical for organizations,
leading to more precise valuation, management, and protection of these assets.133
Despite some statistics showing the likelihood of a massive data breach to be
potentially as low as one percent, the lifecycle of a breach—the time it takes to
contain a new breach—has increased, which means costs and expenses related
to cybersecurity will continue to rise across the board.134
At the same time, the economic viability of insurance companies is threatened
by both the likely onslaught of pandemic-related claims, covering everything
from liability to business interruption coverage, and by the targeting of the same
insurance companies that insure against large data breaches.135 Insurers will
choose settlements over costly litigation, and even when they are successful in
rejecting a claim, it will likely be after costly litigation.136
B. Insurers Will Try to Mitigate the Damage
Experts acknowledge the increased spending on cyber insurance policies;137
but although these policies are profitable, it is a decreasing profitability due in
part to increased competition in the market.138 The growing number of claims
See Reed, supra note 14, at 209.
See WESTON ANSON, INTELL. PROP. VALUATION: A PRIMER FOR IDENTIFYING AND
DETERMINING VALUE, 231 (Weston Anson & Donna Suchy, eds., Am. Bar Ass’n 2005).
134 See IBM, supra note 18, at 48–49 (noting that the likelihood of a data breach ranges
from 1.2 percent for a breach involving 10,000 records to 29.6 percent for one involving
over 100,000 records, and an average breach lifecycle in 2019 was between 279 and 314
days, which is approximately 4.9 to 12.5 percent longer than the average lifecycle in 2018).
135 See L.S. Howard, Canadian Insurers Hit with Lawsuit on Refusal to Pay COVID-19
Biz Income Claims, INS. JOURNAL (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/
international/2020/04/06/563476.htm (discussing the COVID-19-related class action lawsuit
in Canada against major insurers such as Lloyd’s, Intact Financial Corp., and U.K.-based
Aviva Canada).
136 Moorcraft, supra note 34 (discussing how it is not unusual for insurers to deny claims
initially only to settle after the initiation of a lawsuit).
137 See Gutman, supra note 24 (describing the dramatic rise in the number of cyber
insurance claims from 2016 to 2018); see also State of the Cyber Insurance Market, supra
note 24 (discussing a new industry report that suggests the cyber insurance market continues
to grow).
138 See PWC, INSURANCE 2020 & BEYOND: REAPING THE DIVIDENDS OF CYBER
RESILIENCE 11, https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/insurance/publications/assets/reapingdividends-cyber-resilience.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2021) (asserting that insurers will likely
need to reduce premiums and relax limits to compete with the growing field of cyber
insurers); but see State of the Cyber Insurance Market, supra note 24 (contending that
overall, cyber insurance remains profitable, containing payouts for both standalone and
packaged cyber policies).
132
133
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and the increasing size of payouts will likely also contribute to decreasing profit
margins.139 Although many insurers already assess their prospective client’s
cyber risk, often requiring they have outside firms audit and strengthen their
cybersecurity programs,140 insurers will continue to find other ways to lower
costs in order to stay competitive.141 For example, insurers minimize payouts
through a variety of methods, such as strict readings of policy language,142 low
policy limits,143 and lawsuits against third parties that provided the insured with
IT services.144 Some insurers, such as AIG and Lloyd’s, are simply stating more
clearly in their policies what types of cyber events are covered.145 However, it
should be noted that these cost-saving measures can lead to very expensive
litigation: when there are large claims that have disrupted entire industries, the
stakes are high and insureds who have been denied coverage will sue their
insurers, often resulting in equally enormous litigation costs.146
C. Courts Will Complicate Matters Further
The growing number of legal battles over cyber insurance coverages will
increasingly test the viability of the cyber policy.147 Because state laws vary,
the jurisprudence varies, and even seemingly subtle differences can have a
significant impact on an organization’s ability to enforce coverage under its
cyber insurance policy.148 In a 2018 case, for instance, the Court of Appeals for
139 See Vicevich, supra note 8, at 577 (explaining that cyber insurance claims often
involve cascading losses due to interdependency issues and lawsuits, which places final
pressure on insurers).
140 See Dudley, supra note 2 (explaining that insurers usually inquire about the strength
of a prospective policyholder’s cyber security during the underwriting process).
141 See Schoenberg, supra note 127.
142 See Reed, supra note 14, at 168–69 (using as an example how “property damage”
covered in a general policy may not apply when the damage is due to a cyberattack, or how
errors and omissions policies can be read to exclude cyber events triggered by certain
actions).
143 See NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COMM’RS, 2019 REPORT ON THE CYBERSECURITY INSURANCE
AND IDENTITY THEFT COVERAGE SUPPLEMENT 4 (2019) (stating that the average cyber
insurance policy limit is $2.8 million).
144 15 Days of Cyber Insurance: Trends, STAN. CYBER INITIATIVE (Apr. 20, 2016),
https://cyber.stanford.edu/15-days-cyber-insurance-trends.
145 See Griffin et al., supra note 17 (noting that both AIG and Lloyd’s have begun clearly
stating in their policies whether or not cyberattacks are covered).
146 See Christopher Ott, How Cyber Cases Can Inform COVID-19 Business Litigation,
LAW360 (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1257624/how-cyber-cases-caninform-covid-19-business-litigation.
147 See Reed, supra note 14, at 155.
148 See John Bonnie, 11th Circ. Deepens Divide on Ambiguous Insurance Policies,
LAW360 (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1229680/11th-circ-deepensdivide-on-ambiguous-insurance-policies (describing how conflicting interpretations of
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the Second Circuit held that a loss caused by a spoofing scheme was covered
under the insurance policy’s computer-fraud provision because computers were
integral in the scheme’s success.149 The Sixth Circuit agreed and went further
in an analogous 2018 case by construing all policy exclusions against the
insurer.150 This is in direct contrast to previous rulings by the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits, which found that the manipulation of computers alone was insufficient
to cover the losses stemming from the fraud.151
Differing interpretations happen even within the same circuit, contributing
further to the confusion for insurers.152 In a 2018 Georgia case, an Eleventh
Circuit panel narrowly construed proximate cause to find that the insured’s loss
through a hacker attack did not result directly from computer fraud and thus was
not covered by the insurance policy.153 In 2019, a different Eleventh Circuit
panel interpreted proximate cause liberally, holding that the insured’s loss
“resulted directly from” a phishing email and was thus covered by their policy,
despite several intervening events that potentially severed the causal chain
between the email and the loss.154 But perhaps the most closely watched cyber
insurance litigation at the moment is the Mondelez International case,155 in
which the snack-food giant is seeking coverage for $100 million in damages
stemming from a NotPetya attack in 2017.156 Zurich Insurance has denied
coverage under the hostile-or-warlike exclusion in the policy, while Mondelez
has focused on the nature or purpose of the attack to claim coverage.157
Although a broad interpretation of “hostile or war-like act” would allow Zurich
policy language under different state laws has led to “inconsistent guidance to carriers and
policyholders alike”).
149 See Medidata Sols., Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., Case No. 17-2492, 729 F. App’x 117, 118
(2d Cir. 2018).
150 See Am. Tooling Ctr., Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 895 F.3d 455, 465
(6th Cir. 2018).
151 See Reed, supra note 14, at 199–200 (describing the rulings in Apache Corp. v. Great
Am. Ins. Co., 662 F. App’x 252 (5th Cir. 2016) and Pestmaster Servs. v. Travelers Cas. &
Surety Co. of Am., 656 F. App’x 332 (9th Cir. 2016)).
152 See Bonnie, supra note 148 (discussing the recent inconsistent rulings by the
Eleventh Circuit in Interactive Comms. Int’l, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 731 F. App’x 929
(11th Cir. 2018) and Principle Sols. Grp., LLC v. Ironshore Indem., Inc., 944 F.3d 886 (11th
Cir. 2019)).
153 See Interactive Comms. Int’l, Inc., v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 731 F. App’x 929, 935–36
(11th Cir. 2018).
154 Principle Sols. Grp., LLC v. Ironshore Indem., Inc., 944 F.3d 886, 892-93 (11th Cir.
2019).
155 Complaint, Mondelez Int’l, Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. 2018L011008, 2018 WL
4941760 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 10, 2018); see Shniderman, supra note 4, at 64-65 (noting that the
Mondelez case has drawn significant attention from insurance experts and scholars); see
also Levi, supra note 56 (stating that the Mondelez case is likely to set a precedent for many
future cases).
156 See Levi, supra note 56.
157 See Shniderman, supra note 4, at 74.
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to escape paying out the claim, it could lead to controversial exclusions and gaps
in coverage that are not reasonably foreseeable by insureds and further confusion
for insurers and insureds alike.158 Uncertainty over fundamental issues will
undoubtedly continue to hinder an insurer’s ability to properly assess risk and
price their insurance policies.159
V. EVALUATION OF PAST RESPONSES
A. Application of the Budapest Convention
Although the Budapest Convention is the model for a transnational definition
and treatment of cybercrime, some view it as mostly symbolic.160 It has been
noted that although the signatories recognize the treaty’s provisions, their
cybercrime laws are nuanced, differing from country to country and exposing
inconsistencies in jurisdictional as well as substantive matters.161 For example,
some nations, like the US, explicitly assert extraterritorial jurisdiction in
cybercrimes, while other nations, like Iran, assert jurisdiction only when the
breached data was stored or carried through Iranian telecommunications
systems.162 An example of a substantive divergence is Article 3 of the Budapest
Convention on the illegal interception of data.163 Although the convention
requires the criminalization of an unauthorized interception of data, countries
like Switzerland further require that the data be “specially secured,” and France
and Japan penalize intercepting data in transit less harshly than intercepting data
that is at rest.164
Another challenge is that some of the sixty-two mostly European signatory
states have not passed the corresponding domestic legislation, while other
countries have simply chosen reservations as a way to opt out of certain
provisions.165 Additionally, one of the most striking issues with the convention
158 See id. at 74–76 (expanding on the differing meanings of “warlike” or “hostile” act
and the potential ramifications of the courts interpreting them broadly).
159 See Granato & Polacek, supra note 5 (“This uncertainty . . . is important for cyber
insurers because it directly affects the probability that an insurer will have to pay claims in
the event of a data breach and this, in turn, affects how they should price their insurance
policies.”).
160 Perloff-Giles, supra note 108, at 217.
161 See Corcoran, supra note 107, at 26–29 (stating that many of the Budapest signatories
had issued reservations on substantive or jurisdictional points, or sometimes even both).
162 See id. at 28.
163 See Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 107, at art. III.
164 Corcoran, supra note 107, at 37–38.
165 See Corcoran, supra note 107, at 17–18 (explaining that many of the sixty-two
ratifying states have claimed reservations); see also Perloff-Giles, supra note 108, at 217
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is the noticeable absence of top cyber power countries known for sponsoring and
even promulgating cross-border cyberattacks, such as China, Russia, and Iran.166
Thus, while the convention remains an important step toward international
consensus, it fails to reflect the full scope of global cyber threats and cybercrime
laws, and it provides insurance companies only a limited view of the future to
work with.167
B. The Response Back Home
1.

Federal Response

The CFAA has been beleaguered since its inception by its doctrinal
limitations and confusing core provisions.168 For example, two of the law’s key
terms, “without authorization” and “exceeding authorized access,” were never
expressly defined, leaving courts to struggle with both vagueness concerns and
the undesirable blending of civil, contract, and criminal law principles.169 In
addition, many experts feel the current cyberthreat environment, where malware
can spread and cause devastating destruction at lightning speed, calls for
proactive approaches that would potentially run afoul of the CFAA.170
Moreover, some malware activities may not fall under the federal statutes that
would grant an attorney general the authority to disrupt the infected network, a
consequence of federal laws failing to keep up with fast-evolving cybercrime
methods.171 Thus, insurers cannot realistically look to current federal laws to
curb cybercrime, reduce their insured’s exposure, or provide guidance on how

(noting that some of the signatory states have failed to enact domestic laws reflecting the
Convention’s provisions).
166 See Perloff-Giles, supra note 108, at 217 (listing some of the countries who refuse to
join the Budapest Convention, including Russia and China); see also Shannon Vavra, The
World’s Top Cyber Powers, AXIOS (Aug. 13, 2017), https://www.axios.com/the-worlds-topcyber-powers-1513304669-4fa53675-b7e6-4276-a2bf-4a84b4986fe9.html (discussing the
nation-states considered cyber powers due to their hacking capabilities, including Russia,
China, and Iran).
167 See Corcoran, supra note 107, at 17–18 (explaining that several factors prevent the
Budapest Convention from providing a good view of the future of cybercrime).
168 Andrea M. Matwyshyn & Stephanie K. Pell, Broken, 32 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 479,
481–82 (2020).
169 Id. at 484.
170 See Corcoran, supra note 107, at 7; see also Matwyshyn & Pell, supra note 168, at
502.
171 See Matwyshyn & Pell, supra note 168, at 502–03 (giving the example of botnets,
which are a type of malware that steal data from infected networks; in some cases, the data
harvesting does not involve activities deemed illegal under federal statutes and thus
prosecutors may not be able to seek an injunction to take them down).
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courts should view insurer responsibility.172
2.

State Response

Although the states have stepped in to fill in gaps caused by outdated federal
laws, a state-centric approach to cybersecurity laws has proven to be impractical
because most laws do not do enough to address current risks or regulate and
deter inferior cybersecurity practices.173 For instance, New York’s Stop Hacks
and Improve Electronic Data Security Act (“SHIELD”) imposes a limited
number of data security requirements, and the 2017 New York Department of
Financial Services (“NYDFS”) law requiring companies to maintain adequate
cybersecurity measures only applies to financial institutions.174 Although some
states have enacted legislation requiring measures such as the creation of task
forces, the implementation of cybersecurity programs, and the notification of
data breaches, these laws can vary greatly in degree and scope.175 This
inconsistency makes it difficult for insurers to adequately gauge their risk to
properly price their policies.176
The inconsistencies extend to insurance regulations as well. Recognizing the
amount of sensitive data insurance companies handle and their own risk of a
cyberattack, some states have adopted versions of the NAIC’s Data Security
172 See Stretched Beyond the Breaking Point: The CFAA and iPhone Batteries, MICH.
TECH. L. REV., https://mttlr.org/2019/09/stretched-beyond-the-breaking-point-the-cfaa-andiphone-batteries/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2021) (describing the CFAA’s primary shortcomings
which make it a “blunt and volatile instrument, subject to significant differences in
interpretation by prosecutors, judges, and civil attorneys. . .”). The broad and vague
language of the statute captures everyday activities not intended for coverage, and leaves out
potentially criminal actions, making it difficult for modern technology users and developers
to know when their activity falls under the CFAA. Id. See also Corcoran, supra note 107,
at 8–9 (discussing the current issue of vagueness and confusion of the defense strategy
around the world and how this affects the US).
173 See Jeff Kosseff, Hamiltonian Cybersecurity, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 155, 159
(2019).
174 See Cynthia Brumfield, 12 New State Privacy and Security Laws Explained: Is Your
Business Ready?, CSO (Dec. 28, 2020), https://www.csoonline.com/article/3429608/11new-state-privacy-and-security-laws-explained-is-your-business-ready.html.
175 See Cybersecurity Legislation 2019, supra note 122. NCSL lists state laws passed in
2019 that address cybersecurity concerns, such as FL H 5301 Ch. 2019–118 (creating the
Florida Cybersecurity Task Force and requiring an experienced state chief information
security officer), GA H 30 Ch. 3 (funding a Georgia center that promotes enhanced
cybersecurity technology for the private and public sectors), and ND H 1048 Ch. 469
(requiring North Dakota to conduct state research and development of technologies to
protect against data breaches and identify hacking threats). Id.
176 See Meadow Clendenin, “No Concessions” With No Teeth: How Kidnap and Ransom
Insurers and Insureds Are Undermining U.S. Counterterrorism Policy, 56 EMORY L.J. 741,
743 (2006).
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Model Law, which requires that insurers comply with specific cybersecurity
measures.177 However, most other states have not yet followed suit, further
highlighting the lack of national standards for insurers to follow.
VI. ALTERNATIVES AND SOLUTIONS
Over the years there have been several proposals for shoring up the cyber
insurance industry so that it may be better positioned to respond to the increasing
threat of cyberattacks. Some experts contend that the federal government should
be the insurer’s reinsurance and step in to cover losses over threshold amounts
in extreme and specific situations.178 Other analysts call for the creation of a
national framework to oversee all cybersecurity matters involving national
security, including a federal oversight agency and a national security court to
handle insurance coverage disputes arising out of cyber breaches.179 Still, others
believe that more clarity in policy language, combined with educating
policyholders on properly assessing their risk and choosing the appropriate
coverages, will mean more coverage for losses and fewer legal disputes.180
These are, however, generally reactive approaches to cyber threats; a proactive
approach will be the way to ensure the survival of the cyber policy.181

177 See Joseph J. Lazzarotti, Licensed by Your State’s Insurance Commissioner?
Comprehensive Data Security Requirements Are Headed Your Way, NAT’L L. REV. (Aug. 9,
2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/licensed-your-state-s-insurancecommissioner-comprehensive-data-security (listing the states that as of 2019 had passed a
new Insurance Data Security Law modeled after the NAIC’s: South Carolina, Ohio,
Michigan, Alabama, Delaware, Connecticut, Mississippi, and New Hampshire); see also
Cyber Security Legislation 2020, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept. 13, 2020),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/
cybersecurity-legislation-2020.aspx (noting that Indiana, Maine, and Virginia had adopted
versions of the NAIC’s model law as of Apr. 27, 2020).
178 See Kesan & Hayes, supra note 83, at 237; see also Vicevich, supra note 8, at 597–
98.
179 See Scott J. Shackelford & Austin E. Brady, Is It Time for a National Cybersecurity
Safety Board? Examining the Policy Implications and Political Pushback, 28 ALB. L.J. SCI.
& TECH. 56, 57–58 (2018) (“[T]here has been a growing chorus of calls to establish an
analogue of the NTSB to investigate cyberattacks.”); see also Shniderman, supra note 4, at
76 (suggesting several ways to address the Hostile or War-like Action exclusion, including
creating a government body to attribute cyberattacks, and creating a national security court
to hear insurance coverage disputes).
180 See Patrick Cordova & Caroline Meneau, 11th Circ. Insurance Ruling Views
Cybercrime Realistically, LAW360 (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/
1236933/11th-circ-insurance-ruling-views-cybercrime-realistically (contending that cyber
insurance customers should review their policy provisions to ensure they adequately cover
different kinds of cyberattacks); see also DAC Beachcroft, supra note 94 (explaining that in
July 2019, Lloyd’s of London began requiring clarity in its policies as to cyber-exposure
coverages, demonstrating that clearer policy language needed to be prioritized).
181 See DAC Beachcroft, supra note 94 (explaining that approaches to cyber threats
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A. The Regulatory Solution Must Be a Federal One
Traditionally, insurance laws have fallen within the purview of the states.182
However, Congress has periodically exercised its commerce power to enact
critical legislation, such as the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, which
made flood insurance available for the first time,183 and the Flood Disaster
Protection Act of 1973, which required certain types of properties located in
Special Flood Hazard Areas to purchase flood insurance.184 Because insurers
and most of their clients operate across state lines, there is a clear need for
comprehensive data security legislation to protect critical systems, business
networks, and the privacy rights of individuals so that damages incurred by
security breaches never exceed an insurer’s capacity to reimburse its insured.185
While interstate compacts and model laws such as the NAIC’s Data Security
Model Law can provide a unifying set of new regulations, their adoption is not
only voluntary, but the process is also often slow moving despite prompting by
the federal government.186 Additionally, when adopting a model law, each state
similar to the Prudential Regulation Authority may be taken by insurance companies
because cyber risks are always evolving).
182 See McCarran-Ferguson Act, NAT’L ASSOC. OF INS. COMM’RS, https://content.naic.
org/cipr_topics/topic_mccarran_ferguson_act.htm (last updated May 5, 2020) (explaining
that insurance regulation has historically been up to the states; despite the 1944 Supreme
Court decision in United States v. South‐Eastern Underwriters Association which concluded
insurance was interstate commerce and thus within the purview of Congress, Congress has
since reaffirmed the delegation of authority to the states with respect to the regulation and
taxation of the insurance industry).
183 42 U.S.C. § 4001 (2020).
184 § 4012(a).
185 See Kosseff, supra note 173, at 170 (explaining that cybersecurity laws protect the
integrity and availability of data, systems, and networks, in order to protect human rights,
economic interests, and national security); see also Granato & Polacek, supra note 5
(discussing how insurer Penn Treaty became insolvent after inadequately pricing a new line
of business based on their experience with other products); Matthew A. Schwartz & Corey
Omer, The Constitutionality of State Cybersecurity Regulations, THE CLEARING HOUSE,
https://www.theclearinghouse.org/banking-perspectives/2017/2017-q2-bankingperspectives/articles/constitutionality-cybersecurity-regulations (last visited Feb. 24, 2021)
(arguing that the appropriate approach to cybersecurity measures is comprehensive federal
guidelines or frameworks as opposed to a state-by-state approach).
186 See Cybersecurity Legislation 2020, supra note 177 (noting that Indiana, Maine, and
Virginia had adopted versions of the NAIC’s model law and listing three states that adopted
the NAIC’s model law in 2020, bringing the total number of states to eleven as of Apr. 27,
2020); see also State Legislative Brief: NAIC Data Security Model Law, NAT’L ASS’N INS.
COMM’RS & CTR. FOR INS. POL’Y RES. (Dec. 2019), https://www.naic.org/documents/
cmte_legislative_liaison_brief_data_security_model_law.pdf (noting that the NAIC model
law became effective in October of 2017); NAIC Insurance Data Security Model Law
Update, SEC. COMPLIANCE ASSOC., https://www.scasecurity.com/naic-insurance-datasecurity-model-law-update/ (last updated Sept. 2020) (explaining that the federal
government expects complete adoption of the NAIC model law within five years, otherwise
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crafts legislation that is often a nuanced version of the model law, undermining
the attempt at uniformity.187 These variations in state cybersecurity and data
protection laws could also lead to claims that the laws are in violation of the
Dormant Commerce Clause if they appear to be regulating out-of-state activities,
unduly burdening interstate commerce, or subjecting entities to inconsistent
regulations.188 Finally, despite insurance law traditionally being state law, cyber
insurance coverage disputes are almost always litigated in federal courts.189 In
this situation, therefore, Congress can provide the most effective solution by
passing federal guidelines addressing key cybersecurity and cyber insurance
concerns.190
B. New Regulations for Insureds
1.

Organizations Must Reduce Their Cyber Risk

Any federal law must begin by requiring businesses to have cybersecurity
programs in place that include proven cyber defenses such as encryption, data
loss prevention, and employee training, which have been found to significantly
reduce data breach costs.191 Cybersecurity programs should also be required to
include basic—but essential—data security practices, such as patching,
updating,192 and other maintenance conditions that are critical to successfully
preventing security breaches.193 In addition, people-based attacks, such as
Congress could enact legislation setting uniform requirements for insurance data security).
187 See Lazzarotti, supra note 177 (detailing some of the significant differences between
the NAIC model law and the corresponding state laws).
188 Kosseff, supra note 173, at 192–93 (“[S]tate cybersecurity regulations are likely to
face Dormant Commerce Clause challenges . . .”); see Schwartz & Omer, supra note 185
(“Whether state regulations of financial services institutions’ cybersecurity programs pass
muster under the dormant Commerce Clause is an open question that will be answered as
the regulatory regimes are developed.”).
189 See Brian Fullmer, Digital Risk & Ambiguity in Insurance: Tension Between Party
Intent & Risk-Shifting, 62 ARIZ. L. REV. 271, 285 n.59 (2020).
190 See Kosseff, supra note 173, at 159 (“A uniform federal system of cybersecurity laws
. . . would be more effective at achieving the end goals of bolstering the security of systems
and information.”); see also Schwartz & Omer, supra note 185 (“Cybersecurity . . . requires
serious consideration of a national solution.”).
191 See Kosseff, supra note 173, at 188.
192 See Vicevich, supra note 8, at 573 (suggesting effective cybersecurity measures such
as patching and updating should be required under law).
193 See Elizabeth Snell, $2M Settlement Reached in Cottage Health Data Breach Case,
HEALTH IT SECURITY (Nov. 27, 2017), https://healthitsecurity.com/news/2m-settlementreached-in-cottage-health-data-breach-case (detailing the case of California hospital system
Cottage Health: after a data breach in 2013 exposed their inadequate security practices, such
as using outdated and unpatched software, Cottage Health was fined $2 million dollars in
2015 for failing to correct those practices, leading to a second data breach).
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spoofing and phishing, can be thwarted by mandatory security awareness
training, as well as policies requiring live-person validation for requests
involving money or access.194 With these types of attacks on the rise,
organizations must strive to develop a proactive culture focused on prevention,
rather than a reactive culture focused on recovery through cyber insurance.195
Despite the added cost, organizations should view an effective cybersecurity
program as an important investment because it can significantly limit their
losses, as well as the damage to their reputation, which is not covered by cyber
insurance.196
Moreover, the federal government could subsidize this
requirement through tax incentives, providing credits for the implementation of
a cybersecurity program, and setting out a gradual reduction of subsidies over a
specified time period as market forces bring the costs down.197 The government
might even offer additional tax credits for standalone cyber policies.198 Certain
categories of nonprofit businesses that are frequently targeted by ransomware
attackers, such as those handling vitally important data (i.e., hospitals) and timesensitive government benefits (i.e., state unemployment agencies),199 would
receive higher subsidies to offset the costs of maintaining a strong cybersecurity
plan.200 Much like the national flood disaster regulations of the sixties and
seventies, these federally subsidized cybersecurity programs could today
194 See Bissell et al., supra note 1, at 24–29 (stating that training and education are
necessary to reinforce safe cyber behavior); see also Stu Sjouwerman, It Only Takes One
Phish: Puerto Rico Gets Scammed Out of $2.6 Million, KNOWBE4: SEC. AWARENESS
TRAINING BLOG (Feb. 14, 2019), https://blog.knowbe4.com/it-only-takes-one-phish-puertorico-gets-scammed-out-of-2.6-million (contending that companies should establish policies
requiring cyber requests be validated by an alternative medium like a phone call).
195 See Bissell et al., supra note 1, at 27 (explaining that to strengthen cybersecurity,
there must be greater emphasis on “nurturing a security-first culture”); Vicevich, supra note
8, at 573 (suggesting that the current cybersecurity laws are “overly reactive” in nature, one
of the reasons for their ineffectiveness).
196 See GUIORA, supra note 12, at 73; Reed, supra note 14, at 164 (noting that
reputational damage to a company can lead to decreased profits and sales and drops in stock
prices).
197 See Kesan & Hayes, supra note 83, at 246 (suggesting that, similar to the NFIP and
the flood insurance requirement, government subsidies could support a cyber insurance
requirement as the market grows); Schoenberg, supra note 127 (explaining that newcomers
to the cyber insurance market will likely seek ways to offer lower premiums in order to
compete and limit risk at the same time).
198 See Levi, supra note 56 (describing that due to the complicated nature of
cybersecurity, a dedicated cyber insurance policy is better than cyber coverage bundled into
a package policy).
199 See Atkins, supra note 89.
200 See Andrew Rinaldi, The Cost of Cybersecurity and How to Budget for It,
BUSINESS.COM (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.business.com/articles/smb-budget-forcybersecurity/ (describing cybersecurity costs as an amount equal to 5.6 to 20 percent of a
company’s total IT budget).
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prevent an unpredictable amount of damage, including billions of dollars in
losses and countless violations of individuals’ privacy rights.201
2.

Reporting is Key

Legislators, insurance experts, and researchers agree that insurance
companies cannot properly assess the actual cost of cyberattacks when
organizations that have experienced a breach are unwilling to share their
information.202 A federal law mandating that all cyber incidents be reported will
provide insurers with real data they can use to assess their risk and calculate
policy coverages and prices.203 Additionally, government agencies and the
business sector will benefit from a more accurate picture of the cyberthreat
landscape and will use the data to learn about, understand, and avoid similar
attacks.204 Organizations undoubtedly have real concerns when it comes to their
privacy, security, and reputation, meaning they need to be encouraged to share
their information;205 however, this could be dealt with in the same way court
records and proceedings are sealed, depending on the circumstances.206 Thus,
requiring organizations to have cybersecurity measures and report cyber
incidents is not only advisable, it will be key to ensuring the survival of cyber

201 See Kesan & Hayes, supra note 83, at 243 (noting that federal flood disaster laws are
credited with successfully preventing billions of dollars in damages and federal expenditures
and providing millions of people with protection for their properties); see also Granato &
Polacek, supra note 5 (suggesting that improved cybersecurity rules and practices could
potentially help businesses avoid the kinds of catastrophic cyberattacks that later result in
exceedingly high insurance claims).
202 See Reed, supra note 14, at 161 (citing reputational concerns); Vicevich, supra note
8, at 594 (citing liability concerns).
203 See Granato & Polacek, supra note 5 (indicating the lack of historical data as one of
the challenges the cyber insurance market faces); Vicevich, supra note 8, at 577 (contending
that information sharing assists insurers in their premium calculations); but see Wolff, supra
note 83 (arguing for a requirement that insurers report on the correlations between their
cyber products and claims data).
204 See Marc Barrachin & Algirde Pipikaite, We Need a Global Standard for Reporting
Cyber Attacks, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 6, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/11/we-need-a-globalstandard-for-reporting-cyber-attacks (arguing for information sharing so that organizations
can prepare for similar attacks and correct discovered vulnerabilities, and so that regulators
and law enforcement can shape adequate cybersecurity governance, data collection, and
information sharing).
205 See Dan Swinhoe, Why Businesses Don’t Report Cybercrimes to Law Enforcement,
CSO (May 30, 2019), https://www.csoonline.com/article/3398700/why-businesses-don-treport-cybercrimes-to-law-enforcement.html (suggesting that businesses are reluctant to
report because they don’t see a point and law enforcement is unlikely to help).
206 See Robert Timothy Reagan, Sealing Court Records and Proceedings: A Pocket
Guide, FED. JUD. CTR., at 1–2 (Dec. 15, 2010), https://www.fjc.gov/content/sealing-courtrecords-and-proceedings-pocket-guide-0 (explaining generally how and why some court
records and proceedings are sealed from the public).
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insurance.207
C. New Regulations for Insurers
1.

Cyber Policy Language Must Be Standardized

The next focus for any federal law attempting to address the ability of insurers
to cover cyber risks is a requirement for standardized policy language.208
Providing standardized expectations for coverages will have two important
effects. First, it will incentivize the purchase of proper coverage by providing
uniform standards that establish legal definitions for important terms and federal
guidelines on standalone and package policy coverages.209 Many companies
seek cyber coverage through their commercial general liability policies, which
frequently contain exclusions and limitations that lead to confusion and disputes
over coverages and exemptions.210 Standardized language and coverages will
help buyers understand exactly what is covered so that they can choose an
adequate policy for their level of cyber risk.211
A federal standard would additionally rein in, and potentially curtail, the
increasing amount of litigation over coverage disputes.212 As previously
discussed, the differing interpretations of key policy language are giving rise to

207 See Granato & Polacek, supra note 5 (“Better modeling of cyberattacks should help
insurers measure their accumulation of interrelated risks, and improved cybersecurity
standards and practices may help businesses avoid such catastrophic attacks to begin
with.”).
208 See SEAMAN & SCHULZE, supra note 13 (explaining that there is no standard policy
forms and terms and that language varies from insurer to insurer and even policy to policy).
209 Id. (explaining that the lack of standard cyber risk policy language leads to confusion
over coverages; for example, under some policies, data breach losses may include breach
notification and forensic repair costs, while other policies might not cover these losses). See
Levi, supra note 56 (discussing how insureds often choose insufficient coverage due to the
confusing language in cyber policies and explains the improvements made to related
language).
210 See Granato & Polacek, supra note 5 (noting that buyer uncertainty about what a
cyber policy covers is one of the challenges the cyber insurance market is facing); Reed,
supra note 14, at 177 (noting that commercial general liability policies contain exclusions
that can be read to exclude losses stemming from cyber events, such as losses due to
intentional attacks, or damage caused to intangible property like computer software).
211 See Granato & Polacek, supra note 5 (noting that some business may overestimate
the amount of coverage they have for cyberattacks due to the restrictive nature of some
policies that is reflected in their policies).
212 See id. (“Insurance companies are already beginning to write cyber insurance
contracts that more explicitly define what is or is not covered, and this trend should help
limit lawsuits and disputes over cyber coverage.”).
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lawsuits across the nation.213 Consequently, analysts are pointing to cases such
as Mondelez as a litmus test for the future of cyber insurance coverage.214 A
federal law providing narrow guidelines and standardized policies will likely
curb the number of court battles, harmonize jurisprudence, and reduce litigation
costs, which in turn will help support the stability of the cyber insurance
market.215
2.

The Insurer Must Also Take Action (the Carrot and Stick)

The growing cybersecurity threat is too great and too complex for an easy
government fix.216 To better secure their financial positions in preparation for
the next big attack and subsequent claims, insurance companies will need to sell
more cyber policies while encouraging customers to properly assess and insure
their risk.217 Companies that have already invested in a cybersecurity plan may
not see the value in purchasing more cyber coverage than that already included
in their general policy.218 However, insurance companies take advantage of their
relationship with their insureds to provide them with risk management services
aimed at preventing, detecting, and effectively responding to data breaches,
thereby reducing the number of claims and containing the economic damage.219
Insurers use this tool to understand their own risk exposure as well as their
client’s risk.220 Thus, they will need to employ a carrot-and-stick approach in
order to bring in new clients and premiums, encourage customers to employ best

213 See id. (explaining that ambiguities in cyber insurance policies are leading to a rise in
legal disputes around the country); see also SEAMAN & SCHULZE, supra note 13 (explaining
that the lack of standard cyber risk policy language leads to confusion over coverages; for
example, under some policies, data breach losses may include breach notification and
forensic repair costs, while other policies might not cover these losses).
214 See Wolff, supra note 83 (discussing a $2.4 million lawsuit filed by National Bank of
Blacksburg against its insurer, who refused to cover loss that began with phishing emails
and was completed through withdrawals from National Bank ATMs, because the
withdrawals did not constitute a covered cyber incident).
215 See Granato & Polacek, supra note 5 (indicating that court battles over fundamental
issues are one of the challenges the cyber insurance market is facing); see also Wolff, supra
note 83 (asserting that carefully tailored policy measures can “strengthen, stabilize, and
support the development of cyber insurance . . .”).
216 See Ott, supra note 146.
217 See generally Cybersecurity Insurance, CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE SEC.
AGENCY, https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-insurance (last visited Feb. 24, 2021)
(suggesting that insurers promote incentives and best practices among customers).
218 See Levi, supra note 56 (noting that most general insurance policies include some
cyber coverage).
219 See Talesh, supra note 22, at 476–77.
220 See Schoenberg, supra note 127 (explaining that insurers use different methods and
techniques to evaluate their policyholders’ cyber risk in order to limit their exposure to a
claim).
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security practices, and restructure existing portfolios to better meet their
insured’s actual cyber risk.221
The clearest incentive for any organization will be a monetary one. Insurance
companies need to tap into their profit margins to encourage organizations to
implement appropriate security-first practices.222 Insurers generally evaluate a
potential customer’s cyber resilience prior to issuing a policy so that they are in
a position to nudge the customer toward better risk management.223 For
example, insurers could give discounts based on how robust their insured’s
cybersecurity plan is.224 Credits could be given for practices such as: employing
technologies that assist in the rapid detection and containment of a data
breach,225 extensive use of data encryption,226 and training and testing of
employees.227 Higher-risk policies could come with incentives to implement or
improve security measures, especially for small to medium-sized businesses,
which might be excluded from a mandatory cybersecurity plan requirement
under a federal regulation.228 Much like auto insurers give discounts to drivers
who remain accident-free,229 cyber insurers could offer recurring discounts to
customers with cybersecurity programs that remain incident-free or that meet
other security goals the insurer sets.230 Insurers who fail to offer meaningful
221 See Nicole Lindsey, Cyber Insurance Providers Now Incentivizing Clients to Buy
from Specific Vendors, CPO (Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.cpomagazine.com/cyber-security/
cyber-insurance-providers-now-incentivizing-clients-to-buy-from-specific-vendors/
(explaining that cyber insurers are starting to offer discounts and lower premiums in order to
“steer clients in the direction of the most effective security solutions . . . while giving clients
plenty of reasons to adopt risk-reducing behavior.”).
222 See generally JULIE BERNARD, OVERCOMING CHALLENGES TO CYBER INSURANCE
GROWTH 7, 13–15 (Karen Edelman et al. eds., Deloitte Insights 2020),
https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/industry/financial-services/cyber-insurancemarket-growth.html (noting important financial issues that may arise for cyber insurers and
how these issues can be avoided or mitigated).
223 See Levi, supra note 56 (describing how insurers evaluate new clients’ security
postures to assess risk and price policies).
224 See Lindsey, supra note 221 (noting insurers will offer reduced premiums to reward
an insured’s risk-reducing behavior).
225 See IBM, supra note 18, at 66 (suggesting companies invest in security automation
and intelligent orchestration capabilities to help detect and contain data breaches).
226 Id.
227 See Vicevich, supra note 8, at 563 (citing human error as one of the principal causes
of cyber incidents).
228 See Cybersecurity Regulation Exemptions 23 NYCRR 500.19, N.Y. STATE DEPT. OF
FIN. SERV. https://www.dfs.ny.gov/industry_guidance/cyber_exemptions (listing exemptions
to the cybersecurity plan requirement for certain entities such as small businesses with a
limited number of employees and gross revenue).
229 See Mark Fitzpatrick, Car Insurance Discounts, VALUE PENGUIN,
https://www.valuepenguin.com/car-insurance-discounts (last updated Aug. 3, 2020) (listing
multiple insurance companies that offer discounts for good driving records).
230 See Angela Chen, What Happens When Life Insurance Companies Track Fitness
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discounts understand they are competing with other providers and will adjust
accordingly. This “carrot” approach will likely cut into insurers’ profitability,
but any reductions will be offset by increased premiums: new customers
purchasing cyber coverage and existing customers upgrading their current
policies.231 And the company behavior these discounts incentivize should help
control and even curtail the frequency and impact of successful cyberattacks.232
A “stick” approach to cyber insurance will also be necessary to influence how
organizations address their risk.233 Rather than deny coverage post-cyber event,
insurers will need to determine which of their current or potential customers
require specific cyber coverage and then refuse to write their policy unless it
includes that coverage.234 During the underwriting process, insurers typically
evaluate the client’s security posture, make recommendations for coverages, and
set the premiums.235 For example, if it is determined that due to the nature of
the client’s business their cyber policy must be standalone and include certain
maintenance conditions, then the insurer will refuse to write a lesser policy. 236
Although some organizations will accept the terms thanks to their newfound
respect for cybersecurity threats, others will turn to the growing market for
alternative solutions.237 Insurers can work with clients to adjust other policy
coverages in order to keep the required cyber coverage, contractually obligate
the client to eventually convert to the target coverage, or threaten cancellation
altogether. Requiring more robust cyber coverage and spreading it across a
growing field of insurance providers can mitigate risk for the insurers and ensure
Data?, VERGE (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/9/26/17905390/johnhancock-life-insurance-fitness-tracker-wearables-science-health (detailing programs that
reward consumers for meeting goals, such as life insurance company John Hancock
Financial, which requires customers provide their fitness data in exchange for discounts on
their policies, and auto insurer Allstate, who installs a monitoring device in vehicles and
rewards good driving with discounts).
231 See Lindsey, supra note 221 (explaining that discounts and other incentives will draw
new cyber insurance customers).
232 See Vicevich, supra note 8, at 573 (pointing out the effectiveness of basic
cybersecurity measures such as patching and updating); see also Bissell et al., supra note 1,
at 27 (stating that training and education are necessary to reinforce safe cyber behavior);
Snell, supra note 193 (detailing the case of California hospital system Cottage Health,
which could have avoided two data breaches had it implemented more adequate security
practices).
233 See Fullmer, supra note 189, at 301 (explaining that the punitive effect of denying
coverage forces the customer to properly assess and weigh its own risks to make informed
decisions).
234 See id.
235 See Levi, supra note 56 (discussing how insurers assess their clients’ security
postures and price their policies accordingly).
236 See id. (explaining that most cyber policies no longer carry maintenance conditions,
which require organizations continually update and perform certain security measures and
that standalone policies are better than general business insurance policies).
237 See id.
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the viability of their cyber insurance policies.238
VII. CONCLUSION
Society’s dependence on computer technology has brought us to this
inevitable present, where cyber criminals seem to have an ever-evolving ability
to wreak havoc on our lives. Cyber insurance is meant to help victims recover
their losses from a cyberattack, but as the attacks have grown in size and
frequency, they have led to higher claims payouts as well as uncertainties in
coverages that have led to very costly legal disputes. This in turn has set the
cyber insurance market on a perilous path to insolvency.
Because it is increasingly difficult to treat cybersecurity on a state-by-state
basis, the solution to this dilemma must be a federal one. The government must
pass federal regulations requiring public and private sector organizations to have
cybersecurity plans and report cyber incidents. Additionally, the new regulations
must require standardized cyber insurance policy language. Finally, insurers
must make cyber insurance more attractive through monetary discounts and
exercise a bit of tough love in requiring that their insureds purchase coverages
specific to their actual cyber risk as determined by the insurer’s assessment.
These measures are the best way for the cyber insurance industry to achieve
stability and viability so that it may continue to serve as the safety net it is
intended to be instead of a security ring against cyberattacks.

238 See Vicevich, supra note 8, at 557 (noting the fact cyber insurance is not widespread
as one factor that makes the market unsustainable); see also Levi, supra note 56 (contending
that the trend toward more robust cyber insurance policies is growing and that cyber
insurance will eventually become “a standard part of business insurance portfolio”).

